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We are living in the Anthropocene. We have good reasons to dwell a bit with this 
sentence, as its meaning as well as the speech act of its proclamation require 
thorough and careful interpretation. It is a highly disputed and outrageous 
sentence, a hyper-sentence maybe, as its scope and meaning push against the limits 
of our understanding. I at least have to confess that I do not really know about its 
proper reading. Who is the 'we' here? What is the ontological status of this 
phenomenon called 'Anthropocene'?  What does 'living in' mean? Since when? For 
how long? And why declaring it now? What kind of historical momentum does 
this sentence imply? Does it entail values and evaluation? Does it have normative 
appeal? If so, to whom and what about? What would be the proper response? And 
who is in charge to answer these questions anyway? – Not one of these questions 
allows for an easy answer. I take them nonetheless to express the need for the 
humanities in general and philosophy in particular, as these questions have to be 
dealt with when debating anthropogenic global warming and its ideological as well 
as ethical consequences. In this paper, I will spend some time asking to the 
historical momentousness of the aforementioned claim – we are living in the 
Anthropocene – ; in particular, I will dwell with the ontological status of the 
Anthropocene and ask who is meant, when we say that we are living in the 
Anthropocene. To lay my cards on the table, here is my main thesis: The 
Anthropocene urges us to revisit human universalism. But instead of endorsing 
some old-fashioned metaphysical humanism, I want to suggest human 
responsiveness as the key to Humanism 2.0, which will correct modern ideas of 
autonomy towards an idea of subjectivity genuinely thought as relying on 
responsibility. In order to do so, I first want to recalibrate our attentiveness toward 
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the extraordinary scales and measures that the Anthropocene-thesis in fact is 
working on, pondering on the idea that the proclamation of the Anthropocene in 
itself marks an epochal event implying epochal consciousness and a peculiar 
epochal attunement. I then will ponder who is meant in the first-person-plural 
pronoun of the ‘we’, taking issue with contemporary posthumanist and neomarxist 
positions. I end up drawing on a suggestion recently made by historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, though giving it a phenomenological, maybe Heideggerian twist.  
 
We better start thinking! 
The proclamation of the Anthropocene, the Human age, as the current geological 
epoch is highly contested and has given a twist to the scientific as well as the 
political debates concerning climate change and the threat of a dramatic 
transformation of the eco-system of planet Earth (Ellis 2018, Lewis and Maslin 
2018). The historical momentousness of this proclamation is obvious, as the claim 
entails an appeal to engage with the present conditions of what there is. It's time 
for thinking.  
Such an appeal – it's time for thinking – addresses the present situation in its 
topicality. One might object that such an appeal is superfluous or even ridiculous, 
as it always is and has been time for thinking. I agree. But phrasing this sentence, I 
nonetheless try to call for an extraordinary urgency, in so far as it is now, in our 
days, in light of the proclamation of the Anthropocene, that we have to revisit and 
recalibrate the ontological and ethical measures of notably modern Western 
thinking. I assume that the discourse of the Anthropocene marks a turning point 
in Western philosophy, as it challenges our basic vocabulary and conceptual 
framework, with which we describe, what we use to address as natural, societal and 
political processes. Where to enter into this discourse? –  
Some 200 years ago, Hegel addressed the historicity of philosophical thinking. 
In the preface of his lectures on the Philosophy of Right, he states "As for the 
individual, everyone is a child of his time; so, philosophy too is its time 
apprehended in thoughts." (Hegel 2008, 14). A century later, Heidegger reinforced 
the rhetorical gist of this sentence, claiming that "philosophy has no mission to 
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take care of universal humanity and culture, to release coming generations once 
and for all from care about questioning, or to interfere with them simply through 
wrongheaded claims to validity. Philosophy is what it can be only as a philosophy 
of 'its time'." (Heidegger 1999, 14) Both statements provide powerful testimonies, 
encouraging philosophers to engage with the needs of their times. 
Hegel and Heidegger do not only recommend an engagement with the 
current situation as one possible philosophical topic among others. Rather, 
philosophy is nothing else than the attempt to read the signs of the times. Hence 
philosophy just is the name for a discourse on understanding one’s situatedness in 
one’s life time, its historical presence with its challenges and tasks, its processes 
and developments, its possibilities and risks. According to Hegel and Heidegger, 
this task just is what thinking is about (Heidegger 1972).  
In these days it has become unusual – to say the least – to build an argument 
with possible political and historical consequences on the thinking of Hegel and 
Heidegger. Most scholars in the theoretical humanities including philosophy would 
claim that Hegel's Geistphilosophie as well as Heidegger's Seinsdenken are 
metaphysically overcharged and politically suspicious. We do not need master 
narratives that tend to neglect or even to supress the varieties of organic life as well 
as the pluralities of socio-cultural life forms in the name of a teleological process, 
the logic of which is only open to the few, and these few typically being white 
males Europeans, who willingly or not perpetuate the biases of the Western 
heritage. And even when we disregard political worries for a second, the 
specialization of the sciences into ever more disciplines and subdisciplines, 
including the humanities and social sciences, barely supports an overarching 
vocabulary that would be able to support a stance from which the Hegelian agenda 
– reading the signature of our time – could be entertained.   
Or so one thought. But then Nobel-prize laureate Paul Crutzen, an 
atmospheric chemist, proclaimed 'we are living in the Anthropocene'. In my view, 
this sentence is a philosophical claim in the sense of Hegel and Heidegger as 
circumscribed above. Crutzen, Stoermer, Steffens, Zalasiewicz and the scientific 
societies, panels, commissions and projects they and their colleagues represent, are 
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in fact putting forward a Hegelian statement, when declaring our time as the 
Anthropocene. They suggest that science is forced to interpret the current 
development of the key indicators of the functioning of the Earth system in a way 
that expresses the insight concerning these responses being driven by the ever-
growing human imprint on the planet, thus announcing the emergence of the 
Anthropocene. As such, the term 'Anthropocene' does not refer to an object, a set 
of entities or to an identifiable event. That is why it is contested. Like the notion 
of the Holocene as the official denomination of the latest geological epoch, the 
term 'Anthropocene' provides an attempt to address the simultaneity of significant 
changes of the ecological system under one heading. We apprehend our times in 
thought, when claiming with Crutzen and others that we are living in the 
Anthropocene.  
 
The thing called the Anthropocene 
But then again, the gist of this sentence and its explanatory force does not rely in 
finally having found the correct classificatory entry for the current geological 
period. What does one refer to when stating that we are living in the 
Anthropocene? Apprehending our time as the Anthropocene means to articulate 
the all-pervasive signature or 'Stimmung' that shapes life on Earth as an ontological 
key. The concept of Anthropocene provides a name for a sort of planetary 
'Befindlichkeit' or attunement. Using this term (Befindlichkeit) of Heidegger's 
(Heidegger 1962), one might say that the planet find itself thrown in the 
Anthropocene. The sentence 'We are living in the Anthropocene' then does not 
only refer to a geological system of classification in a somehow neutral scientific 
description. It denotes what it is like being earthlings in our times. It expresses 
what Karl Jaspers (Jaspers 1933) called an 'epochal consciousness'. For humans 
and non-humans alike, existence is conditioned by human activities and 
anthropogenic impact on the environment. To many species and genera in organic 
life this being conditioned even implies their extinction. So the Anthropocene 
articulates what it is like being on planet Earth in a bio-geological epoch, which is 
69 
 
characterized by the atrocities of the metabolism of the human species and its 
effect on the eco-system. 
 The Anthropocene then is the name for the ultimate ontological frame of 
what there is. As such, as said before, the Anthropocene itself is neither an entity 
nor a set of objects or processes. It is the name for a general frame that enables us 
to see and understand entities, objects and processes in the first place. 
Understanding entities and events in light of the Anthropocene means to adopt a 
different kind of ontological frame that changes our understanding of what there 
is.  
As the historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) in a seminal paper has argued, 
the proclamation of the Anthropocene marks the event when Earth history and 
World history are declared to have become intertwined. Before that, we used to 
think of Earth history in geological time scales independent of the history of 
human civilisation. We used to take Earth history as providing so called natural 
conditions that organic life, including human life, in the process of evolution has 
to adjust to. Earth history had its catastrophes and episodes of mass extinctions of 
flora and fauna due to asteroid downfall or continental drift or climate change 
caused by deviations of solar activity. But we are now most likely witnessing 
another (the 6th) process of mass extinction; and all indicators are telling us that 
this process is caused by human activity. From a philosophical point of view, it 
doesn't matter, whether this 'now' is said to begin already with the mastery of fire 
by our hunter-gatherer ancestors, or with the agricultural revolution 10.000 years 
ago, or – following the Orbis Spike hypothesis – around 1610 as a result of 
European imperialism and the exchange of species (including smallpox and 
measles) across the oceans, or around 1800 with the steam engine and the industrial 
use of fossil energies, or around 1950 according to the so called 'Great 
Acceleration' (see Lewis and Maslin 2018 concerning the debates of the beginning 
of the Anthropocene). The important thing is that human activity ultimately has 
become a geological, an Earth-historical factor. The Anthropocene-thesis 
undermines the nature/culture-distinction in historical measures. It corrects the 
belief that Earth-history and World-history are referring to two different 
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ontological domains with independent time-scales. Human civilizations cannot be 
understood as unfolding itself on the basis of background conditions beyond 
human reach. Maybe most of us would wish it wasn't so. But we have to learn that 
the Earth-World-distinction belongs to the premature version of modern 
philosophical nihilism. Thus, matured by the tragedy of expansive planetary 
humanification, we now have to learn that we cannot distinguish any longer 
between planet Earth on the one hand and the World of human activity on the 
other. The drama of the Anthropocene gives the struggle between Earth and 
World, which Heidegger famously had located in the work of art, another twist 
(Heidegger 2002). It announces globalization to be not just a socio-economic play, 
but a planetary epos that shapes the way future earthlings will describe their habitat. 
 I repeat, the Anthropocene as such is not an experiential object or 
phenomenon. But reading the signs as part of a text entitled 'The Anthropocene' 
shapes the way those phenomena appear. The concept of the Anthropocene is 
hence a result of interpretation; it denotes what Claude Romano has termed a 
hermeneutical event (Romano 2009). This interpretation makes sense of various 
and heterogenous phenomena that in themselves already are complex entities and 
complex phenomena. Global warming, the loss of biodiversity, the rise of ocean 
sea levels, Western Imperialism, Eastern Imperialism, global capitalism, fossil 
energy companies, the traffic infrastructure, the entertainment industry, the food 
production industry --- all these phenomena and many more are facets of the 
Anthropocene. One might argue that the concept of the Anthropocene roughly 
covers what Ancient thinking thought of as human hybris and Christian 
metaphysics used to capture as the evil in all its guises. But I do not want to moralize 
or evaluate here. I just want to depict the ontological status of the concept of the 
Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is literally a meta-physical conception, an idea 
that transcends physis or nature. It is not an object, not even a hyper-object. It is 
the result of an interpretation, providing sense to a manifold of somehow 
connected complex phenomena. Due to its hermeneutic origin one might call it an 
idea, an idea that nevertheless proves to be more real than any of its phenomenal 
manifestations. The term 'idea' means that it provides the guiding and 
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comprehensive perspective – the ontological frame, as I said above, or the 
ontological key as Befindlichkeit – in which phenomena are seen and experienced.  
The notion of the Anthropocene then refers to a phenomenal reality that in 
its totality withdraws from its givenness as an object, a set of objects or 
corresponding processes.  
Anthropologist Jarrett Zigon (2018) has introduced the term 'situation' in 
order to grasp the ontological status of concepts like the Anthropocene. I want to 
borrow his emphasis on the situation for a while, as it highlights our being involved 
in what we use to think of as anonymous processes. Seeing our time in light of the 
Anthropocene then means to transform the geological, evolutionary as well as 
biographical timescales into the situational now of its urgency. We have a situation 
here – but there is no base in some extra-terrestrial Houston that could fix the 
situation and its problems for us. Understanding the Anthropocene as a situation 
means to acknowledge that its concept is geo-historical. It has a temporal as well 
as a topological impact, interpreting the current situation of what there is, of the 
cosmos of antiquity, the world of the moderns, the Earth of the geologists; only 
that the now as well as the here of its reference are bursting the limits of what we 
normally understand by a situation or situating concepts. Proclaiming the 
Anthropocene then means to transform the universe into a situation. And you 
have to note the singular of this formula: It means to acknowledge THE situation. 
There is only one.  
Hence declaring the period, we happen to live in as the Anthropocene, is to 
historicize the cosmos. It demands to think in cosmological historical measures, in 
time spans and spatialities that go beyond our usual ontological framework or 
forms of intuitions of time and space, and yet it transforms a neutral geological 
period into a demanding geo-political situation. We have to rethink our ontological 
vocabulary in light of the event of the proclamation of the Anthropocene. 
It shouldn't be necessary, but let me nonetheless underline that addressing 
the Anthropocene as an idea or a hyper-phenomenon, as something that is a non-
object enabling the interpretation of certain processes and objects, does not mean 
to deny the reality and significance of human impact on the eco-system. It does 
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not mean to deny the loss of biodiversity, the toxification of air, soil, ocean- and 
freshwater, the exponential increase of the use of fossil fuels and human induced 
global warming. What is more, all this has already begun long before the notion of 
the Anthropocene was launched; decades or centuries, maybe even millennia ago. 
But comprehending all this under one name by simultaneously interpreting these 
signs and symptoms as phenomenal manifestations of a new geo-historical epoch 
transforms these processes into something different. They become parts of one 
event; they gain their meaning as being parts of a whole that was not available as 
such before its proclamation. The proclamation is the event; the proclamation of 
the Anthropocene.  
I am putting some weight on this because the theoretical humanities in 
general and philosophy in particular are challenged on their very own domain, 
which is the domain housing the art of critique and interpretation. Only this time, 
Earth System Scientists have entered the scene, interpreting data and complex 
causal relations by projecting them towards an all-encompassing idea that as such 
cannot be proven or accounted for by the means of empirical sciences alone. They, 
not some academic philosopher with a Hegelian or Heideggerian background, have 
presented a master narrative under the name of the Anthropocene that ultimately 
suffices to address the importance or planetary urgency of the development at 
issue. This proclamation is an invitation and a gift to the humanities, as Latour 
(2014) has commented. As with all gifts, we – social scientists, researchers from 
the humanities – have to prove that we can live up to the pressure that this gift 
puts on us, whether we can cope with the responsibility implied to give again.  
For these reasons, I think we better take the sentence 'we are living in the 
Anthropocene' to express the signature of our times. I do not know of a sentence 
with similar importance or significance. We better do our best in our efforts 
understanding it. 
 
Who is this 'we'? – Grappling with posthumanism 
But there it was again: 'we'. Whom do I refer to when I say that we better should 
do our best in our efforts understanding the sentence 'we are living in the 
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Anthropocene'? Is it all currently living human beings? Does it encompass non-
human animals as well? What about waterfalls and i-phones? 
Timothy Morten opens his book 'Humankind' (2017) with a reflection about 
the impossibility to find a proper pronoun to address what he calls 'the symbiotic 
real'. In particular, he ponders about the difficulties and pitfalls of using the first-
person plural 'we':  
Right now, in my part of the academy, I'm not allowed to like 'We are all Earthlings', that 
song by the Muppets, let alone sing it as if it were some kind of biospheric anthem. I'm 
supposed to condemn it as deeply white and Western, and so appropriative of indigenous 
cultures and blithely ignorant of racial and gender difference. I'm trying to make the 
academy a safe space in which to like 'We Are all Earthlings'. This boils down to thinking 
hard about the 'we'. (Morton 2017, 4f).  
I agree with Morton on this one. I think we should bracket the otherwise 
recommendable post-colonial reservations towards the metaphysics of the ‘we’ for 
a moment in order to think hard about it and to reflect on its meaning and 
reference under conditions of the Anthropocene. Morton refers to what one may 
call the mainstream posthumanist paradigm in recent humanities that senses 
violence and suppression in any such white Western 'we'. From the point of view 
of posthumanism, referring to such a 'we' unavoidably installs the ontological, 
political and ethical basis for all sorts of chauvinism. ‘We’ seems to install a 
demarcation line between us and them, between humans vs. non-humans. From 
there the highway is opened up leading to traditional metaphysical humanism that 
used to be built on human exceptionalism.  
In various guises posthumanist interventions rightly fight against 
metaphysical humanism. They do so along two different dimensions: against the 
human/nonhuman-distinction; and against the human/not-quite-human-anyway-
distinction, making their case in the name of inter-species justice and intra-species 
justice respectively. Whereas the first distinction basically echoes the alleged 
superiority of the human species over and against other biological species, as 
traditionally maintained by Jewish-Christian religions and modern Western 
metaphysics, the second distinction fuels the historical chauvinisms based in race, 
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nationality, gender, sexuality, social class etc. A certain ideal type of humanity is set 
– male, white, free, creative, strong, catholic, protestant, blond, blue eyes etc. – and 
those who do not fit the list find themselves to be excluded from humanity proper, 
facing the violent and often lethal consequences of this logic of exclusion. Giorgio 
Agamben (2004) analysed the logic behind both dimensions in terms of the 
'anthropological machine', that one way or the other generates superior humanity 
over and against the not-yet or not-anymore-human.  
As to the first dimension, many scholars contest the monolithic unity of the 
human organism, recalling the fact that the body of mine that is right now writing 
this paper in fact is a sort of biological polis or symbiosis, containing millions of 
bacteria and viruses. It hence is not at all clear what the first-person singular 
pronoun 'I' really refers to. Cartesian dualists have an easy answer, as they consider 
the ego to express the res cogitans, the thinking substance, which is without 
extension and hence indivisible and one, not many. This 'I' has – somehow – a 
machinelike body and manifests itself in co-existence with its bodily mechanisms. 
But strictly speaking, it remains an unphilosophical manner of speaking if one 
refers to oneself by pointing at one's body. The true ego is the mind or the soul. 
In these days, Cartesianism serves as the scapegoat or main suspect responsible for 
many of the ideological pathologies in the development of Western culture, 
especially so because of its mechanistic and instrumentalist view of organic life that 
offers human exceptionalism the means to the ruthless exploitation of non-human 
life. But despite its bad reputation and its metaphysical inconsistencies, 
Cartesianism is not dead. In my view, certain tendencies in recent transhumanism 
seem to require a Cartesian dualist ontology. They presuppose the ontological 
possibility to isolate mental states from the organic body, for instance in mind-
uploading techniques that seek to replace the organic body by Avatars or 
holograms (notoriously so endorsed by Kurzweil 2006).  
Those of us who consider the body being an integral part of one's personal 
identity have to deal with the fact that the organism that I for instance believe to 
be does not represent an ontological unity in the strict sense. The body of mine is 
a microcosmos or microbiome. Maybe I should refer to myself rather using 'we' or 
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even 'they', as this would express the insight that the organism that I am referring 
to using the pronoun ‘I’ functions as a vehicle for millions of bacteria that inhabit 
this microbiome of mine/ours. The human/non-human distinction of traditional 
humanism is flawed then; there is nothing like human purified from non-human. 
We have to learn that the very concept of the human species only makes sense, in 
so far as the individual members of this species are understood as multispecies-
conglomerations, as complex systems, the stability of which presupposes the 
smooth symbiotic collaboration of myriads of free-lance workers in the joint 
project of keeping this body alive and going. Pushing this thought a little further, 
one might hold that the sentence ‘we are living in the Anthropocene’ is hopelessly 
flawed, as it perpetuates the arrogance of Western humanism. Either we 
acknowledge the complexity of the multispecies symbiotic reference implied in any 
meaningful ‘we’ – then ‘Anthropocene’ is a misnomer. Or we ignore posthumanist 
biology and keep on using personal pronouns to refer to subjects and subjectivities 
– then we just continue the metaphysical violence inherent in metaphysical 
humanism. 
Donna Haraway (Haraway 2008, 2016) argues along these lines, holding that 
the 'Anthropocene' can only be a boundary event, as the human age has proven to 
be a geological pathology that either leads to the catastrophic collapse of the eco-
system or at best prepares what Haraway calls the 'Chtulucene', named partly after 
chthonic ancient and modern Earth goddesses, as the opportunity for the surviving 
species to establish multispecies assemblages with refuge possibilities in an age of 
'multi-species becoming-with'.  
But does this mean that one cannot speak of human beings at all? Is the very 
category of the Anthropos metaphysically flawed? Is any reference to an ‘ego’ as 
the experiencing subject that assigns bodily states as belonging to the organism 
that is experienced as its lived body prohibited? Not at all. From the fact that my 
organism is an organized manifold of actually many organisms, a microcosmos, 
does not follow that this integrative manifold is prohibited from experiencing itself 
as a unity or union. This union can even experience moments of disintegration, in 
diseases when bacterial or viral intruders threaten the stability of the system. This 
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union can be called 'human' in contrast to other possible unions or microbioms 
that display different organizational patterns. Nothing of this presupposes an 
essentialism that would condition the correct use of the concept of the human to 
the distillation of some human essence over and against non-human essences. I 
can refer to myself as a human being without this reference implying the neglect 
or the suppression of my enteric flora or the evolutionary ontogenesis of my 
cellular structure in its continuity with other mammals or with all aerobic 
organisms. Already Plato thought of the human soul or character as a complex 
unity, imagining it in analogy to a political community with divergent and maybe 
even struggling parts that nota bene are organized according to the virtue of justice 
(and not power or suppression). 
 
Who is this ‘we’? – Recognizing the normative dimension 
However, the issue at stake is not just one of metaphysics and the possibility of 
representing and referring to complex processual systems as ontological unities. It 
also and foremost is about the politics of distributing normative commitments and 
entitlements, their scope and legitimation, all of which is linked to conceptions of 
agency and responsibility. To put it into a rhetorical question: Which kind of 
assemblage is capable of speaking on behalf of the other-than-human, if not those 
whom we used to consider as human beings? At the end of the day it is us – some 
subset selection of the species of homo sapiens to be qualified further – who have 
to deal with the ethical and normative implications of the processes captured by 
the term Anthropocene. The current planetary situation displays the need to 
rethink our concepts of life and living in a way that is highly attentive to the 
ecological complexities that humans and non-humans alike are entangled in. But 
contemporary naturalism (including its posthumanist versions from Bennett over 
Haraway to Braidotti) fails to address the normative dimension in a way that would 
explain its ontological possibility. Where do we locate the addressees of normative 
commitments and entitlements? How can we account for the value of multispecies 
being-with? What are the conditions of possibility for an organism (or any other 
entity) to be responsive to norms and ethical values? In my view these questions 
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indicate that we cannot do with versions of ‘flat’ ontologies that confine 
themselves to disclosing ecological or symbiotic interdependencies. Understanding 
the sentence ‘we are living in the Anthropocene’ requests to deal with its implied 
normativity; and this means to place the inherent responsibility to something or 
somebody capable of acknowledging or responding to this claim of responsibility. 
For that reason, I do not think that there is something wrong with the 
concept of the Anthropocene. It remains however an urgent task to come to terms 
with the concept of the Anthropos in light of an ontological concept of 
responsibility. I cannot elaborate on this topic in this paper, but will come back to 
this central issue with a remark further down.  
What about the socio-political snares inherent in the appropriative 'we'? Some 
researchers prefer the term Capitalocene and argue that the prefix anthropo- obscures 
the specific economic and political relations that have driven the technological 
development of capitalism. Whether the paradigmatic example is the steam engine 
and the coal industry (Malm 2016) or the exploitation of “cheap” natural resources 
(Moore 2016), the central problem of climate change is not the human but the 
forces of capitalism (Angus 2016). According to this view, the category of the 
human naturalizes the problems of the Anthropocene by blaming humans as such 
rather than a specific economic system, thus letting capitalism ‘off the hook’. In 
this perspective, global warming amplifies the global injustice that capitalism in the 
guise of imperialist colonialism has installed since the European conquerors 
appeared at the American, African and Australasian coasts. The economies and 
countries of the Global North are causally responsible for most of the carbon 
dioxide emissions that fuel global warming; it most likely will be the poor countries 
of the Global South which have to suffer most from the ecological consequences. 
In fact, they already do. In acknowledgement of this imbalance the Kyoto protocol 
from 1997 and the Paris agreement in 2016 use the formula of a 'principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities', the Paris declaration adding 'and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.' This is a 
political statement in the sense that it will be up for future negotiations to distribute 
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obligations in correspondence to differentiating responsibilities, taking differences 
of capabilities and other national circumstances into account.  
Dipesh Chakrabarty took this principle as his point of departure in his Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values in 2015 (Chakrabarty 2015). I want to follow his line 
of thought for a while, but will depart at the end, taking a different route that 
hopefully defends some sort of universalism. Chakrabarty's lectures try to establish 
a perspective from which the antinomy 'common but differentiated' can be 
understood in a way that avoids this formula to be squelched in the mill wheels of 
national economic or political interests. The very category of the Anthropos in the 
Anthropocene is hence disputable and needs clarification. He writes: "It must be 
of interest to scholars in the humanities that the word human has turned out to be 
one of the most contested and disputed categories of the social and political 
literature on climate change." (Chakrabarty 2015, 156)  
 
The antinomy of the ‘we’ 
Chakrabarty introduces two distinctions, namely the distinction between a 
'homocentric' and a 'zoecentric' view of the world ('zoecentric' from the Greek zoein, to 
live, or zoon, living being), and the distinction between 'homo' and 'anthropos', the 
Latin and Greek words for human being respectively (Chakrabarty 2015, 147). 
Albeit philosophers like Heidegger, Carl Schmitt and Hans-Georg Gadamer as well 
as historians working with globalization and environmentalists at the end of the 
last century were about to understand the truly global significance of European 
expansion, of capitalism and the distribution of modern technology, they end up 
remaining homocentric; "Humans were at the center of this narrative, however it 
was told" (Chakrabarty 2015, 152). But beginning with the enormous effect of the 
most famous copy of nature photography ever published, namely 'Earth Rise', 
taken by Apollo commander William Anders on Chrismas Eve 1968, the zoecentric 
view on the World began to take shape, according to Chakrabarty. This view 
concerns about Earth and the Earth system as the habitat for all life as such, 
introducing the maybe faint idea that climate change cannot be dealt with on the 
basis of the means and routines of existing economic and political institutions, as 
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these are developed to support 'ordinary human flourishing'. 'Earth Rise' triggers 
or exhibits what I have called the attunement of the Anthropocene. Those who 
respond to this photograph zoecentrically share epochal consciousness in the sense 
of Jaspers, sensing the appeal or the request that comes along with the aesthetic 
reception of the picture to care for the planet as such.  
The distinction of Anthropos and homo is drawn along similar lines. Whereas 
homo stands for 'humanity as a divided political subject', Anthropos covers 'collective 
and unintended forms of existence of the human, as a geological force, as a species, 
as a part of the history of life on this planet'. Anthropos then is a causal and 
descriptive category. In that sense, talking about anthropogenic climate change 
indicates where the current process of climate change differs from earlier instances 
of rapid climate change in Earth history. As such, Anthropos it is a Saussurean 
marker of difference; "it is a causal term that does not signify any moral culpability" 
(157). Homo on the other side reflects the ethical and the political aspect of the 
human factor implied in the Anthropocene. It is the aspect that worries about 
coming famines due to global warming, the water crisis in Cape Town South 
Africa, poverty in India and elsewhere. This then is the deadlock as we have to be 
both, zoecentric Anthropos and homocentric humans. In the words Chakrabarty: 
But who is that 'we'? We are simultaneously a divided homocentric humanity, and a 
dominant species and thus a part of the history of life on this planet. […] With this 
collapsing of multiple chronologies – of species history and geological times into our very 
own lifetimes, within living memory – the human condition has changed. (Chakrabarty 
2015, 180)  
I think Chakrabarty is right. Proclaiming the Anthropocene means 
acknowledging that the human condition has changed. And I suspect that this 
change goes into the opposite direction of what posthumanism has taught us, as it 
implies to focus once again on humankind and the historical significance of 
human, including Western civilization. However, this assessment does not mean 
to fall back into Western rationalism and its metaphysical humanism. Rather, we 
find ourselves confronted with a situation similar to what Kant had envisaged as 
the antinomy of pure reason. An antinomy in the sense of Kant expresses a 
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contradiction of two prima facie mutual contradicting statements – a thesis and its 
antithesis – that both seem to can be proved (Kant 1930, B 448 ff.). As philosophy 
subscribes to the logical principle of non-contradiction, we cannot endorse both 
sentences at the same time, which is why Kant scrutinizes the ontological 
difference that is inherent in the two statements, so that they in fact are not 
referring to the same object (or so that they in fact are not in logical contradiction, 
but exhibiting subcontrary oppositions). So, the antinomy I see is the following: 
Thesis: There is no 'we humans', as there is no human essence. Humankind is distributed 
pluralistic, as it has been shown by various post-enlightenment conceptions endorsing cultural or 
historical relativism. What is more, as the brutal history of especially Western so-called civilization 
has proven, any effort to defend 'The Human' supresses and violates illegitimately the manifold of 
human life forms. 
Anti-thesis: There is and must be some ontological underpinning that supports the 
meaning of the phrase 'we humans'.  The situation called 'The Anthropocene' addresses the human 
as such. The urgency of the current crisis of the Earth system requests to take this situation as a 
common responsibility that allows and maybe presupposes the possibility of 'we humans' or 'us 
qua being human'. 
Clearly Chakrabarty highlights the significance of the Antithesis. According 
to Chakrabarty, living memory is just not any longer linked to a family's or a 
generation’s or a certain group's life-time. Species history and geological time have 
entered into the experiential horizon of current living humans and non-humans 
alike. Chakrabarty hopes that "the crisis of climate change, by throwing us into the 
inhuman timelines of life and geology, also takes us away from the homocentrism 
that divides us." (Chakrabarty 2015, 183)  
So far, I agree with Chakrabarty. But I think we have to introduce another 
distinction in order to account for the Anthropos. Piling up the evidence for 
anthropogenic causality as the main factor to the current crisis is not sufficient in 
order to argue for the commonality of 'we humans'. It doesn't counter 
posthumanist worries either. I want to start at a different angle. I want to go back 
once again to Heidegger's anti-essentialist notion of 'Dasein'. To my purpose we 
don't need to subscribe to the agenda of Being and Time as such. We just need to 
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keep in mind that 'Dasein' is not a biological nor a social category. It is a formal 
denominator for a life form that is qualified by entertaining its being in a way that 
this very being is an issue for it. "Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter 
anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß 
es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um sein Sein selbst geht", Heidegger famously 
stated (Heidegger 1979, 12.). Surely Heidegger thought that the category of Dasein 
happens to be co-extensive with the category of human beings; and Heidegger uses 
these terms elsewhere if not interchangeably, then with the same reference. But it 
nonetheless in principle remains conceivable that there might be members of other 
species, organic or silicon based, able to perform Dasein. I am inclined to think of 
'responsibility' in a similar manner. I want to suggest thinking of human beings as 
responsible beings. And I want to argue that 'we humans' happens to be co-
extensive with the phrase 'we responsibles'.  
I draw here on an account in the post-Heideggerian tradition of Hans Jonas, 
Jean-Luc Nancy and notably Bernhard Waldenfels. In this perspective, the 
proclamation of the Anthropocene is not primarily a claim about the causal 
trajectories that in all its complexities can be reduced to a single cause as the trigger 
of global warming and other catastrophic phenomena appearing in our current 
situation. It does however change the human condition, as Chakrabarty has said. 
It changes what it means to be human as it now, with the proclamation of the 
Anthropocene, primarily means to be a responsive, a responsible being.  
What I mean is the following: The event of the proclamation of the 
Anthropocene joins human beings as the addressees of a request that humans have 
to respond to. This 'have to' is taken to be as a pre-normative or maybe existential 
commitment. It might help to think of the etymology of the word 'responsibility' 
here. Somebody responsible means somebody who is able to respond. So we have 
to think of responsibility as response-ability. The real event of the proclamation of 
the Anthropocene is the proclamation by the Anthropocene to the Anthropos, to 
the human beings as the one's being able to respond to this claim. Those addressed 
by the Anthropocene are 'we humans'. 'We humans' hence does not refer to those 
exhibiting the essence of humanity in any biological or metaphysical sense. There 
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is no human essence. ‘We humans’ renders a nominalist expression covering those 
who are addressed by the proclamation of the Anthropocene. As I said earlier, the 
Anthropocene-thesis is highly reflexive; it is a claim put forward by humans about 
humans addressing humans. It thus performs an illocutionary act that occasionally 
determines and joins those who are able to respond, thus being subsumed under 
the category of the Anthropos. I cannot but sense a Hegelian element here as well: 
maybe the proclamation of the Anthropocene is the proclamation of the 
Anthropocene made by the Anthropocene to the Anthropos. As long as non-
human people or other-than-humans cannot be committed to respond, we humans 
have to do the job in and as the community of absolute responsibility. Solidarity 
with non-human people presupposes the ability to respond on their behalf.  
So, the Anthropocene refurnishes humanism. Instead of rationality, freedom, 
power or technological creativity, humanism 2.0 might be built upon responsibility. 
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